GLOBALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND TERMS OF TRADE MOVEMENTS

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Several authors, notably Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), have argued that there is a secular tendency for the terms of trade for primary commodities to deteriorate over time. The confirmation of such a tendency through historical data is of course problematical. Since such data also include those for years characterized by unusual occurrences, like World Wars and breakdowns of currency regimes (as happened to the Bretton Woods system in 1971), which have the effect of suddenly pushing up primary commodity prices, any tendency towards secular deterioration gets obscured by these sudden occasional boosts. For long stretches of time, both before and after such sudden boosts however, a secular deterioration in the primary commodity terms of trade is clearly discernible. In particular, the fact that these terms of trade have moved against primary commodities over the last couple of decades, precisely when the contemporary phenomenon of globalization is claimed to have manifested itself, is undeniable.

Explanations for such a secular tendency for the terms of trade to move against primary commodities have invariably focussed on the behaviour of goods markets. Many of theses explanations of course, including Prebisch's own celebrated one, are logically untenable. Prebisch argued that the effects of technological progress, leading to increases in labour productivity, in the manufacturing segment of the world economy do not get "passed on" in the form of lower prices, while the effects of similar technological progress in the primary commodity segment do; this according to him caused a secular deterioration in the primary commodity terms of trade. A little reflection however would show that while Prebisch's remarks about the divergent effects of technological progress in the two segments are extremely perceptive, such divergence *per se* cannot possibly explain any secular decline in primary commodity terms of trade[1].

Let us denote the primary commodity price by pa. Then the price of the manufactured good p, in a regime of mark-up pricing (which is a plausible assumption for this sector and in line with Prebisch's assumption about its monopoly character) is given by

$$p = (a. \, pa + w.pl)(1 + m)$$

where a and l denote, respectively, the amounts of primary commodity and labour inputs per unit of manufactured good output and w the product wage rate in the manufacturing sector (it makes no difference to the argument if this wage rate is assumed alternatively as being fixed in terms of command over the primary commodity itself). Now, it is obvious that any reduction in l through technological progress, if matched by a corresponding rise in w, as Prebisch visualized, leaves p unchanged, and hence the terms of trade; likewise however any reduction in pa, through technological progress, lowers p proportionately, and hence also leaves the terms of trade unchanged. It follows that any difference between the sectors on whether labour productivity growth is passed on through lower prices, makes no difference to the terms of trade. (What is more, technological progress in the form of a reduction in a, should be *improving* the terms of trade for

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1.The argument which follows is discussed in greater detail in Patnaik (1997)

primary commodities; similarly difficulties in producing primary commodities owing to non-renewability of resources or to land -scarcity etc. which show themselves in the form of a *reduction* in the labour productivity in this sector should be *improving* its terms of trade, as Ricardo (1951) had postulated).

The only explanation for a secular deterioration in the primary commodity terms of trade (other than an *increase* in a which can be ruled out) can be *either* an increase in m, *or* an increase in wl, *or* both; that is, *either* an increase in the wage-share in gross output of the manufacturing sector, *or* an increase in the profit-share *or* both.

We have of course considered a simplified universe where there are only raw material prices, wages and profits, but no taxes by the State, or other forms in which surplus value may manifest itself. Once we recognize these, then we have to re-interpret m as the "surplus margin", and not just the "profit-margin". A rise in commodity taxation by the State in the manufacturing segment for instance would, *ceteris paribus*, cause a deterioration in the primary commodity terms of trade. The enormous increase in the role of the State in the advanced capitalist economies, which occurred in the era of monopoly capitalism and was associated with a rise in the "surplus margin", but not with any offsetting fall in the share of wages in the gross value of output, must therefore be an important factor underlying the secular deterioration in the primary commodity terms of trade, both in the years before the beginning of the Second World War and also in the 1952-71 period (between the collapse of the Korean War boom and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system).

In the era of "globalization" however, especially the "freeing" of exchange rate regimes, an additional factor has entered the picture and has perhaps been an even more important explanation for the terms of trade decline for primary commodities than the usual explanations, including the one just presented. The purpose of the present paper is to focus on this factor. It argues that the "liberalization" of exchange rate regimes which is a part of the process of "globalization" has an independent, powerful and separate effect on the terms of trade which has its origin in the currency markets and not the goods markets. This effect arises from the secular tendency of the real values of third world currencies to fall, relative to the dominant currency in a regime of "liberalized exchange rates".

I

A capitalist economy cannot function without a stable medium for holding wealth. In a modern capitalist economy this means a currency, which, though no longer backed by any commodity (viz. precious metals), has nonetheless a value vis-a-vis the world of commodities that either remains stable, or falls, if at all, only slowly over time, at a rate lower than the ratio of carrying costs of commodities to their values. In the context of the capitalist world economy this means one dominant currency out of the multiplicity of national currencies whose value vis-a-vis the world of commodities is not susceptible to rapid declines, which, in other words, is "as good as gold".

It is an appreciation of this fact which underlay the Bretton Woods system's decreeing the US dollar to be "as good as gold" by fixing its price vis-a-vis gold. But, even after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the snapping of its gold link, the US dollar continues to be considered by wealth-holders all over the world to be "as good as gold". In other words for the dominant currency to be considered "as good as gold" it is not necessary that its price should be officially fixed in terms of gold; it is enough if wealth-holders consider it to be so. And a system where its price is not so fixed,

if wealth-holders did not consider it to be "as good as gold", cannot simply function.

Of course the dominant currency is not the only currency in terms of which wealth is held. There are several other currencies too which constitute receptacles of wealth. But a condition for their doing so is that their relative values vis-a-vis the dominant currency must themselves be relatively stable. This requirement, in the case of other currencies of the advanced capitalist countries which are substantial receptacles of wealth, is fulfilled through appropriate deflation of their economies. Deflation works in their case, and hence the requirement of reasonable stability in the relative values of the currencies can be fulfilled without much difficulty, because their currency values are highly sensitive to deflation. Indeed it is this fact which makes these currencies sufficiently attractive, so that they can function as substantial receptacles of wealth, in addition to the dominant currency. At the same time however they are different from the dominant currency, in so far as their economies do need to be deflated in order to keep them on a par with the dominant currency. Or putting it differently, the dominant currency is dominant because its value in terms of other currencies is expected on the whole not to fall even when its economy is functioning at full capacity, while the same cannot be said of the other currencies (which is why their economies need to be deflated in order to preserve their status as a wealth-holding medium).

There are however certain other currencies, notably the third world currencies, whose relative values are not very sensitive to the deflation of the domestic economies. (Even if deflation can temporarily prevent a decline in currency value, the effect is only temporary and a further shock may well trigger off a further decline in currency value even at the deflated level of activity, which puts the currency on a downward slide). The reason for this has to do with the history of capitalism which essentially began as a phenomenon of the Atlantic Sea Board and continues to be so, with Japan, the only non-colonized country of the rest of the world, being the only genuine example of its extension. This extended area constitutes the home base of capitalism, while the rest constitutes the outlying region where capital makes forays for profit but is on the whole less secure. As a result, not only does capital, especially finance capital (including even finance capital in the contemporary era of globalization that appears internationally highly mobile) demand a higher real rate of return in the outlying region than in its home base for moving out into, or staying put in, the former, but, even at rates of return equal to, or higher than, this threshold rate of return, only a finite amount can move out. Putting it differently, for any third world country there exists a threshold real rate of return (interest) such that, if the actual rate is below it, there are significant capital outflows, while if the actual rate is equal to or above it there are only finite inflows. And these inflows do not change noticeably when the interest rate is increased from one above-threshold level to another. It follows that if the currency is on a downward slide, then raising the interest rate is not efficacious in arresting that slide via its capital account effects. What is true of interest rate changes, viz. their inefficacy in boosting the value of the currency via capital account channels, is true of other measures of deflation as well. When the currency is on a downward slide, deflating the economy, via its capital account effects, has only a limited arresting influence on this slide.

To be sure, any deflation also has current account effects, and these in principle could make deflationary measures effective. But here we come to another hurdle. The extent of deflation that can be usefully undertaken in any particular period as a currency stabilizing measure is limited, that is, subject to an upper bound. If it crosses that bound then its harshness evokes protests from the working people. This has the effect of undermining the "confidence" of finance capital and stimulating capital flight, which contributes to a further accentuation of the currency slide. What is more, deflationary measures such as tighter money or interest rate increases, if undertaken with

harshness, tend to dampen the stock market, and cause capital losses. The prospects of making capital losses, sustained by the actual experience of such losses, drives capital away from the country. Deflation beyond a certain limit, in other words, becomes counter-productive as a currency-stabilizing measure[2].

Added to this is another fact. A reduction in the value of the currencies of such economies, taken as a whole, does not, on its own, have a positive impact on the state of excess demand for foreign exchange. Any positive impact it might have through the capital account can occur only if price expectations in the foreign exchange market are inelastic at the prevailing level of activity. But this *ceteris paribus* inelasticity vis-a-vis the dominant currency is ruled out by the very nature of the dominant currency itself (namely, its relative value is generally expected not to fall vis-a-vis other currencies). A fall in the value of a third world currency therefore, far from alleviating excess demand pressures on the foreign exchange market, would, if anything, accentuate such pressures, as far as capital account channels are concerned.

What is more, for third world economies taken as a whole, a fall in currency values would not alleviate excess demand pressures in the foreign exchange market even via its current account effects. It would at best have little impact; but it *can* even worsen the state of current account excess demand. This is because these economies are trapped into a pattern of international division of labour where they specialize in the production and exports of primary commodities, or at best "lower-level" manufactured goods whose price elasticity of demand is low. To be sure, there is some diversification among some of them into more sophisticated manufactured goods; but even here there is only a limited range of such products where diversification is possible (Ghosh and Chandrashekhar 2001). Not only are a host of third world countries competing for the export potential in this limited range of goods, but the success of one group is invariably associated with the decline of another. There is in other words a remarkable pattern where the "successful" position is occupied by one set of countries after another. East Asia first tasted this "success". As South East Asia began to exploit the export prospects in this limited range of sophisticated manufactured goods, East Asian success began to disappear. Likewise the export performance of South East Asia itself began to decline as China moved into this very slot. It follows that if we take the third world countries as a whole, the price elasticity of demand for their exports is low. Likewise the price elasticity of demand for imports, taking all these countries together, is low, owing both to inadequate technological capabilities, and the culturally-conditioned preference for metropolitan goods. Consequently a reduction in the value of the currency cannot reduce the current account excess demand for foreign exchange. If the effect of the reduction in the value of the currency is lower export prices, despite the inelastic demand, then the excess demand for foreign exchange on the current account would actually *increase* owing to the exchange rate depreciation. If the export price remains unchanged, thanks either to capitalists' collusive action or to government action, taking cognizance of inelastic demand, then the excess demand situation remains unchanged.

What has just been said does not mean that a *particular* country in the third world cannot experience an improvement in its balance of payments current account owing to an exchange rate depreciation. It can, but at the expense of other third world economies. If we take these countries as a whole then

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[2] It has in fact been suggested that the Indian government's strategy in recent years for attracting foreign capital has been to lower the interest rate in order to stimulate a stock-market boom that would entice capital inflow.

a synchronous depreciation in their currency values would not improve their current account balance of payments. To be sure, such depreciation is never synchronous. But as each tries to protect itself from the effects of the other's depreciation, i.e. as their currency values chase one another downwards, their current account deficits, taken as a whole, would be no better. The gain, in terms of an improvement in the currency account of the balance of payments, which each country makes from a currency depreciation can only be transitory, until the others have retaliated.

It follows then that third world currency slides are neither spontaneously self-limiting at any given level of activity, nor necessarily capable of being arrested through a deliberate reduction in the level of activity, given the fact that there is a limit to the extent of deflation that can be usefully undertaken for the purpose. This property is both a result as well as the cause of the fact that these currencies are not considered a secure medium of holding wealth. Hence there is a secular tendency for wealth to move out of these currencies into those of the advanced capitalist countries. This does not mean that wealth is not actually held in these currencies. History, and the fact that large numbers of domestic wealth-holders are quite content to remain in their own currencies instead of pursuing text-book "rationality", ensures that the bulk of local residents' wealth, though not large by international standards, continues to be held in the form of these currencies or assets denominated in them. But in a world characterized by free movements of finance capital, the secular tendency *ceteris paribus* is for capital to move out of these currencies. This secular tendency for a capital outflow from the third world, no matter what the level of activity, gives rise in turn to another secular tendency, namely *a secular tendency for exchange rates to depreciate, not just at any given level of activity, but even despite reductions in the level of activity through deliberate deflation.*

In discussing movements in exchange rates till now, we have said nothing about rates of inflation; the assumption clearly has been that commodity prices remain unchanged. The discussion in other words has focussed on currency markets, with the implicit assumption that any change in the nominal exchange rate results in a corresponding change in the real exchange rate. The above-mentioned secular tendency for the exchange rate to depreciate refers therefore to a secular tendency for the *real* exchange rate to depreciate. Of course the real exchange rate may be incapable of any movement whatsoever. For example in a world with mark-up pricing and wage-indexation, any change in the nominal exchange rate would lead to a matching change in the price-level leaving the real exchange rate unchanged. In such a case the secular tendency for the real exchange rate to depreciate would manifest itself in hyperinflation. But in a world where wages are not indexed, this secular tendency would get realized as a secular decline, through fluctuations, in the real exchange rate.

The foregoing argument can be recapitulated as postulating a hierarchy of currencies in the world economy. At the apex there is a dominant currency which is "as good as gold" and constitutes the safest medium of holding wealth. (What makes a currency a dominant currency is a matter that need not detain us here. Possibly the armed might of the State to which the currency belongs and which can ensure that the value of crucial universal intermediaries, like oil, cannot rise inordinately in terms of its currency, gives this currency a special status. In other words underlying the dominant currency is not only a structure of imperialism, but in fact an implicit commodity standard). Below this are the currencies of the major capitalist countries which also constitute a safe medium for holding wealth, but are maintained in that status through the deflation of their domestic economies: in their case in other words deflation works in stabilizing the currency values. Finally at the bottom there are the third world currencies which do not constitute a safe medium of holding wealth. In their case deflation does not necessarily work in stabilizing currency values, and hence the secular tendency is

for a capital outflow as well as a decline in *real* exchange rates no matter what the level of activity[3].

II

One can of course argue, quite plausibly, the existence of such a secular tendency for the real exchange rate to decline for reasons other than those cited above, that is, for reasons having nothing to do with the capital account of the balance of payments. If for instance the elasticities of home demand for foreign goods and of foreign demand for home goods are such that the Marshall-Lerner conditions are not fulfilled, then the excess demand curve for foreign exchange with respect to its price would not be downward-sloping even on current account transactions. In such a case, with flexible exchange rates (and assuming that history begins with an excess demand for foreign exchange), there would be a tendency for the real exchange rate to decline from the current account side that may not be capable of being nullified by capital account behaviour. Since third world exports are of primary commodities with low elasticities of demand, and imports are of manufactured goods that are considered essential and hence are likely also to have low elasticities of demand, the tendency for such a secular decline arising from the current account side is by no means unlikely. The question naturally arises: why should one offer a "capital account explanation" for a phenomenon for which a simple "current account explanation" clearly exists?

There is a difference however between the two explanations. If we look only at the current account transactions then it would appear that deflation of an appropriate order of magnitude can always do the trick of stabilizing the foreign currency market. Consider any single period. Since the demand for foreign exchange depends upon the level of activity, an appropriate reduction in the latter through deflation can always eliminate any excess demand for foreign exchange, whatever be its price. When we consider the capital account however, the pitfalls of deflation, which may start a capital flight, become obvious. There is, as mentioned above, a certain limit to the extent to which the economy can be deflated in any particular period. And if this much deflation is insufficient to arrest a capital

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[3]The argument can be put more precisely in the following manner. The level of excess demand for foreign exchange (expressed as a proportion of total demand for foreign exchange) in any period depends on the level of capacity utilization u (a pure number and proxy for aggregate demand relative to full capacity output), and on the rate of growth of foreign exchange price g in the preceding period (which forms the basis of expectations). Actual foreign exchange price as mentioned earlier has only a limited effect on excess demand, and is hence ignored. The level of excess demand in turn determines the actual rate of growth of foreign exchange price in the current period (in a disequilibrium setting). On this basis we can postulate

$$g(t+1) = A + b.\{u(t) - u'\} + c.g(t) + e$$

where e represents erratic non-negative shocks (they cannot be negative given the nature of the "dominant currency"). It is clear that for e=0, there exists a certain level of u where g is zero, i.e. the foreign exchange market is in equilibrium. When e>0, as long as it is small, deflation can still keep g at zero. But if e is large and positive, then the required deflation may exceed the "permissible limit" (let us denote it by du), in which case the currency market gets de-stabilized and g becomes positive. In this case in other words e > b.du. This destabilization however gives rise to a cumulative slide if (c-1).e > b.du.
    Since excess demand does not respond to price changes, the value of c is very large, and since it also has a limited response to deflation the value of b is small. It is this which makes cumulative instability so plausible in third world economies. For non-dominant advanced countries, as argued above, the value of b is very large while that of c is likely to be small. It is clear that even if a cumulative downward slide is brought to an end at a lower value of the currency by some exogenous development, such as an IMF-package that transfers domestic assets to foreigners in return for "confidence"-boosting loans, a further large shock would once again push it further down in a cumulative fashion.

flight that has begun, on account, say, of some external shock, then decline in the exchange rate triggered by the shock would continue. In other words, it is only when we take into consideration the capital account transactions that we can understand why a secular decline in the real exchange rate may continue despite reduction in the level of domestic capacity utilization. Since the real exchange rates in a number of third world countries have declined in recent years, as we shall see below, even when these countries have been experiencing significant amounts of deflation resulting in relative declines in their levels of activity, a "capital account"-based explanation appears far more apposite than the one based on current account transactions alone.

III

A secular decline in the real exchange rate however is not synonymous with a secular decline in the terms of trade of the primary commodities. To claim otherwise would entail the same error, mentioned earlier, as the claim that terms of trade decline for primary commodities because technological progress in this sector is "passed on" in the form of lower prices. Indeed from the point of view of the manufacturing sector of the world economy, i.e. the advanced capitalist countries, the lowering of the prices of primary commodities owing to technological progress is exactly analogous to the lowering that comes about through a real exchange rate decline in the producing countries. Such a decline however would alter the terms of trade (as indeed would the "passing on" of technological progress in primary commodity production) if there is a "ratchet effect" on manufactured goods prices, so that they never decline in absolute terms. (There may also be a "ratchet effect" on the profit-margin of the manufactured goods sector, so that it never declines in absolute terms; but assuming such an effect on the profit-margin is not necessary for the present argument). In other words, if the pricing behaviour of the manufactured goods sector is given by

$$p = \max\{p(t\text{-}1) \; ; \; (a.pa + w.l)(1+ m)\}$$

then any tendency towards a secular decline in the real exchange rate gives rise to a secular decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities. Associated with such a decline of course is an increase in the "surplus margin" m in the manufactured goods sector, i.e. in the magnitude of the profit-cum-tax-cum-circulation cost mark-up. Which components of this composite mark-up go up as the terms of trade decline in secular terms for primary products is an issue we do not discuss here (the aggregate demand effects would be quite different depending upon which component increases). Likewise, whether it is an autonomous increase in the surplus margin that is countered, *apropos* its inflationary effect within the advanced capitalist segment, by the decline in the terms of trade for primary products arising from the tendency for the real exchange rate to decline, or whether the increase in the surplus margin is induced by the terms of trade decline, i.e. whether it is the first or the second term in the R.H.S. of the above equation that determines p in any period is a matter we do not discuss here.

IV

A very preliminary effort was made by us to test the proposition of a secular tendency for the real exchange rate to decline for the third world economies[4]. Using easily-available data from the

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International Financial Statistics, and that too for a small number of arbitrarily selected countries for whom long-term statistics on prices and exchange rate were available on a consistent basis, we calculated the real exchange rate of each of these economies by taking the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis the US dollar, and multiplying it by the ratio of the US Wholesale Price Index to the Wholesale Price Index of the country in question. For India, for instance, the time-series of real exchange rates is calculated by taking, for each year, the nominal exchange rate (Rs./$). WPI (US)/WPI (Ind). The countries taken were 11 in number, but the period over which the time-series is available varied across countries. The graphs together with the (linear) trend are given in the Appendix.

Apart from two cases, namely Zambia (1966-1975) and South Korea (1949-1999), the trend in every instance is upwards, indicating a secular depreciation in the real exchange rate. For South Korea however the picture is distorted by the Korean war boom; if we take any period starting from 1952 onwards and ending in 1999, we get a positive trend. And for Zambia we get a positive trend if we take the period 1975-1999. It follows that the proposition about a secular decline in the real exchange rate is well-established. To be sure, in a few cases the fluctuations are so sharp that we can not draw very firm conclusions about the nature of the trend. But even in these cases, notwithstanding the tentativeness of the conclusion, the direction of the trend is upwards.

No doubt a host of objections can be raised against the method adopted by us. In particular, the use of the wholesale price index can be objected to on the grounds that they do not correctly represent the price-index of exports. But primary commodity prices, it must be remembered, have declined more sharply, relative to both the domestic and the export prices of the US, than the domestic prices in most of these economies. Since primary commodities are by no means insignificantly represented in the export baskets of these economies, deflating their nominal exchange rates by the ratios of export prices would have given even sharper declines in the real exchange rates than what we have got through deflating the nominal exchange rates by the ratios of wholesale prices. In any case, the effort is exceedingly preliminary. What is striking however is the fact that even such a preliminary effort throws up such a stark decline in the real exchange rate in secular terms for so many third world countries.

V

The association between the emergence of finance capital and the decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities has been widely discussed in the Marxist literature, from Rudolph Hilferding (1910) to Michael Kalecki (1954). But the reasoning has always been of the following kind: the emergence of finance capital is associated with the formation of cartels and trusts, i.e. monopoly combines. This causes an increase in what Kalecki was to call later the "degree of monopoly", which *ipso facto* raises the terms of trade of the "monopolized sector" vis-a-vis the "non-monopolized sector"[5]. Since a prominent component of the latter are the primary producers, a decline in the terms of trade for primary producers is associated with the emergence of monopoly capitalism. The argument can be carried further. The rise in the "degree of monopoly" is not just a once-for-all

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[5] The only exception to this would be if the entire "burden" of the rise in the "degree of monopoly" falls on the share accruing to the domestic workers whom monopoly capital faces. But this is an unlikely extreme case.

phenomenon. It continues even after monopoly capitalism has come into being. (Or alternatively the "surplus margin" rises owing *inter alia* to the increasing weight of the State under monopoly capitalism). As a result, the terms of trade movement against the primary commodities becomes a feature of monopoly capitalism[6].

Interestingly, through much of the nineteenth century the terms of trade had moved *in favour* of primary commodities, while this trend got reversed towards the end of the century, a fact attributed by many writers, including Eric Hobsbawm (1969), to the rise in the "degree of monopoly" associated with the transition from "competitive" to "monopoly" capitalism. The fact that this deterioration in the terms of trade for primary commodities might have continued until the Second World War can then be explained by the continuous tendency for the "degree of monopoly" (or alternatively "surplus margin") to rise in the course of monopoly capitalism.

This entire *genre* of explanations looks at terms of trade movements in terms exclusively of pricing behaviour in product markets. In other words all these explanations can be constructed by assuming fixed exchange rates between currencies. To be sure, pricing behaviour in the product markets has to be a component of any explanation of terms of trade movements, which after all refer to prices. Additionally however wealth-holding behaviour plays a role in terms of trade movements, mediated no doubt by pricing behaviour in product markets, via its effect on exchange rates, especially in a world characterized by the dominance of freely mobile international finance capital, such as we have today. The purpose of the present paper has been to highlight this aspect.

One conclusion that emerges from this paper is the absolute necessity for third world countries to have controls over capital flows. The case for such controls has been argued extensively. But if the argument of the present paper is correct, and there is a secular tendency for a decline in the real exchange rates of third world economies, then this provides a powerful additional argument for enforcing capital controls. The latest illustration of the damage that the wealth-holding behaviour of capitalists, both domestic and foreign, can inflict on an economy in a world of freely-mobile international finance capital, is provided by Argentina. India where the process of getting caught in the vortex of international finance is still incomplete must learn appropriate lessons from this experience.

Statistical appendix

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[6] This is in fact the argument regarding the autonomous increase in the "surplus margin" that was mentioned at the beginning of the paper.

Real Exchange Rate of Sri Lanka -1974-1999.

Real Exchange Rate of Mexico-1949-1999

Real Exchange rate for Venezuela--1949-1999

Real Exchange Rate for Colombia--1949-1999.

Real Exchange Rate for Costarica 1949-1999

Real Exchange Rate for India 1949-1999.

Real Exchange Rate for Zambia for 1966-75

Real Exchange Rate for Zambia 1979-1995.

Real Exchange Rate for Indonesia 1971-2000

Real Exchange Rate for South Korea 1949-1999.

Real Exchange Rate for Paraguay 1949-2000.

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