FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION AND RURAL BANKING IN INDIA

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Financial liberalization after 1991 decimated the formal system of institutional credit in rural India. It represented a clear and explicit reversal of the policy of social and development banking, such as it was, and contributed in no small way to the extreme deprivation and distress of which the rural poor in India have been victims over the last decade. This paper examines the impact of changes in banking policy and structure on the rural economy, and on the rural poor in particular.¹

Financial liberalization is a crucial component of the programmes of economic reforms that are being imposed on the people of less-developed countries. The demand that financial markets be liberalized quickly is high on the agenda of imperialism; in India as well, advocates of economic “reform” see financial liberalization as being at the core of structural adjustment. There are many components of the package of reforms associated with financial liberalization in India. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2002) classify the policies of financial liberalization in India into three types: first, policies to curtail government intervention in the allocation of credit, secondly, policies to dismantle the public sector and foster private banking, and thirdly, policies to lower capital controls on the Indian banking system.

It is well known that the burden of indebtedness in rural India is very great, and that despite major structural changes in credit institutions and forms of rural credit in the post-Independence period, the exploitation of the rural masses in the credit market is one of the most pervasive and persistent features of rural life in India. Rural households need credit for a variety of reasons. They need credit to meet short-term requirements of working capital and for long-term investment in agriculture and other income-bearing activities. Agricultural and non-agricultural activities in rural areas typically are seasonal, and households need credit to smoothen out seasonal fluctuations in earnings and expenditure. Rural households, particularly those vulnerable to what appear to others to be minor shocks with respect to income and expenditure, need credit as an insurance against risk. In a society that has no law of free, compulsory and universal school education, no arrangements for free and universal

¹ This paper is based on the Introductory essay in Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2004) and on Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2002).
preventive and curative health care, a weak system for the public distribution of food and very few general social security programmes, rural households need credit for different types of consumption. These include expenditure on food, housing, health and education. In the Indian context, another important purpose of borrowing is to meet expenses on a variety of social obligations and rituals.

If these credit needs of the poor are to be met, rural households need access to credit institutions that provide them a range of financial services, provide credit at reasonable rates of interest and provide loans that are unencumbered by extra-economic provisions and obligations.

Historically, there have been four major problems with respect to the supply of credit to the Indian countryside. First, the supply of formal sector credit to the countryside as a whole has been inadequate. Secondly, rural credit markets in India themselves have been very imperfect and fragmented. Thirdly, as the foregoing suggests, the distribution of formal sector credit has been unequal, particularly with respect to region and class, caste and gender in the countryside. Formal sector credit needs specially to reach backward areas, income-poor households, people of the oppressed castes and tribes, and women. Fourthly, the major source of credit to rural households, particularly income-poor working households, has been the informal sector. Informal sector loans typically are advanced at very high rates of interest. Further, the terms and conditions attached to these loans have given rise to an elaborate structure of coercion – economic and extra-economic – in the countryside.

That these constitute what may be called the “problem of rural credit” has been well recognized; recognized, in fact, in official evaluations and scholarship since the end of the nineteenth century. Given the issues involved, the declared objectives of public policy with regard to rural credit in the post-Independence period were, in the words of a former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, “to ensure that sufficient and timely credit, at

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2 The formal sector of rural credit is the sector in which loan transactions are regulated by legislation and other public policy requirements. The institutions in this sector include commercial banks, Regional Rural Banks, cooperative banks and credit societies, and other registered financial institutions. The informal sector of credit is not regulated by the public authority, and the terms and conditions attached to each loan are personalized, and therefore vary according to the bargaining power of borrowers and lenders in each case.
reasonable rates of interest, is made available to as large a segment of the rural population as possible” (Rangarajan 1996, p. 288). The policy instruments to achieve these objectives were to be, first, the expansion of the institutional structure of formal-sector lending institutions; secondly, directed lending, and thirdly, concessional or subsidized credit (ibid.). Public policy was thus aimed not only at meeting rural credit needs but also at pushing out the informal sector and the exploitation to which it subjected borrowers. Rural credit policy in India envisaged the provision of a range of credit services, including long-term and short-term credit and large-scale and small-scale loans to rural households.

**BANKING POLICY IN RURAL INDIA: 1969 TO THE PRESENT**

The period from 1969 to the present can be characterised as representing, broadly speaking, three phases in banking policy vis-à-vis the Indian countryside. The first was the period following the nationalization of India’s 14 major commercial banks in 1969. This was also the early phase of the ‘green revolution’ in rural India, and one of the objectives of the nationalization of banks was for the state to gain access to new liquidity, particularly among rich farmers, in the countryside. The declared objectives of the new policy with respect to rural banking - what came to be known as “social and development banking” - were (i) to provide banking services in previously unbanked or under-banked rural areas; (ii) to provide substantial credit to specific activities, including agriculture and cottage industries; and (iii) to provide credit to certain disadvantaged groups such as, for example, Dalit and Scheduled Tribe households.

The introduction of social and development banking policy entailed a radical shift from prevalent practice in respect of the objective and functioning of commercial banks. An important feature of the policy of social and development banking was that it recast completely the role of commercial banks in rural banking. Prior to 1969, the countryside was not considered to be the problem of commercial banks. It was only after 1969 that a multi-institutional approach to credit provision in the countryside became policy, with commercial

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3 For a more detailed discussion, see Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2002).
banks, Regional Rural Banks and cooperative institutions establishing wide geographical and functional reach in the Indian countryside.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued specific directives with respect to social and development banking. These included setting targets for the expansion of rural branches, imposing ceilings on interest rates, and setting guidelines for the sectoral allocation of credit. Rural credit was an important component of the ‘green revolution’ package; the first post-nationalization phase of expansion in rural banking saw a substantial growth in credit advances for agriculture. Specifically, a target of 40 per cent of advances for the “priority sectors,” namely agriculture and allied activities, and small-scale and cottage industries, was set for commercial banks. Advances to the countryside increased substantially, although they were, as was the green revolution itself, biased in respect of regions, crops and classes. The two main crops that gained from the green revolution, as is well recognized, were wheat and rice, and the application of the new technologies was primarily in the irrigated areas of the north-west and south of India, with the benefits concentrated among the richer classes of cultivators.

In 1975, the Government established by ordinance and then legislation a new network of rural financial institutions called the Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), which were promoted by the Government of India, State governments and commercial banks. These were created on the basis of recommendations by a working group on commercial credit, also called the Narasimham Committee, and were intended to “combine the cooperatives’ local feel and familiarity with the business acumen of commercial banks” (Jagan Mohan, 2004, p 22). The number of such banks expanded rapidly, and covered 476 districts by 1987 (ibid.).

The second phase, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was a period when the rhetoric of land reform was finally discarded by the ruling classes themselves, and a period when the major instruments of official anti-poverty policy were programmes for the creation

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6 On the unequal impact of the green revolution and the “region-wise, crop-wise and class-wise concentration of production” as a result of the green revolution, see Prabhat Patnaik (1975). See also Griffin (1975), Bhalla and Chadha (1990), Bharadwaj (1990), Dhanagare (1990).

7 For a detailed review of the establishment of RRBs and their performance before and after liberalization, see Jagan Mohan (2004).
of employment. Two strategies for employment generation were envisaged, namely wage-employment through state-sponsored rural employment schemes and self-employment generation by means of loans-cum-subsidy schemes targeted at the rural poor. Thus began a period of directed credit, during which credit was directed towards “the weaker sections.”

The most important new scheme of this phase was, of course, the Integrated Rural Development Programme or IRDP, a scheme for the creation of productive income-bearing assets among the poor through the allocation of subsidized credit. The IRDP was initiated in 1978-79 as a pilot project and extended to all rural blocks of the country in 1980. There is much writing on the failure of IRDP to create long-term income-bearing assets in the hands of asset-poor rural households. Among the many reasons for this failure were the absence of agrarian reform and decentralized institutions of democratic government, the inadequacy of public infrastructure and public provisioning of support services and the persistence of employment-insecurity and poverty in rural society. Nevertheless, the IRDP strategy did lead to a significant transfer of funds to the rural poor.

The second phase also involved an expansion and consolidation of the institutional infrastructure of rural banking. “Even ardent critics of India’s growth strategy,” wrote a noted scholar of India’s banking system, “would admit that what the country achieved in the area of financial sector development before the present reform process began, particularly after bank nationalization, was unparalleled in financial history” (Shetty 1997, 253). After bank nationalization, as Shetty points out, there was “an unprecedented growth of commercial banking in terms of both geographical spread and functional reach” (ibid.).

The third and current phase, which began in 1991, is that of liberalization. The policy objectives of this phase are encapsulated in the Report of the Committee on the Financial System, which was chaired, ironically, by the same person who recommended the establishment of Regional Rural Banks, M. Narasimham (RBI, 1991). In its very first paragraph, the report called for “a vibrant and competitive financial system…to sustain the

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8The problems with the IRDP included misidentification of beneficiaries, high initial costs involved in the acquisition of the loan to the borrower, small loan size leading to purchases of relatively low quality assets or small changes in working capital. Consequently, the programme failed to generate sustained long-term improvements in incomes. On the failures of the IRDP, see MIDS (1980), Osmani (1990), Dreze (1990) and Swaminathan (1990).
ongoing reform in the structural aspects of the real economy.” The Committee said that redistributive objectives “should use the instrumentality of the fiscal rather than the credit system” and, accordingly, that “directed credit programmes should be phased out.” It also recommended that interest rates be deregulated, that capital adequacy norms be changed (to “compete with banks globally”), that branch licensing policy be revoked, that a new institutional structure that is “market-driven and based on profitability” be created, and that the part played by private Indian and foreign banks be enlarged.

Let us make it clear that, before the 1990s, the banking system was open to much criticism, particularly of its bureaucratic failures, its insensitivity to the social and economic contexts in which it functioned, and class and regional inequalities in lending patterns. The reforms proposed in 1991, however, were not attempts to bring rural banking closer to the poor, but to cut it back altogether and throw the entire structure of social and development banking overboard.⁹

Record of progress of rural banking

Policies of the current phase of financial liberalization have had an immediate, direct, and dramatic effect on rural credit. There has been a contraction in rural banking in general and in priority sector lending and preferential lending to the poor in particular (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2002, Shetty 2004, Chavan 2004).

Let us consider a few indicators. Appendix Table 1 documents the growth of bank offices, deposits and gross bank credit in rural areas as well as the share of rural areas in the all India total from December 1969 to March 2002, for all scheduled commercial banks. The impact of bank nationalization on the growth of scheduled commercial banks in rural areas is clear: the share of rural bank offices in total bank offices jumped from 17.6 per cent in 1969 to 36 per cent in 1972. The share then rose steadily, and attained a peak of 58.2 per cent in March 1990. From then onwards, there was a gradual decline in the share of rural bank offices, and the share fell below 50 per cent in 1998 and thereafter. In fact, there was an absolute

⁹ For a discussion, see Shetty (1997).
contraction in the number of bank offices in the 1990s: 2,723 rural bank offices were closed between March 1994 and March 2000.10

Official banking statistics do not, unfortunately, give us information on the volume of advances in a specific year. The basic source of data on banking is the Reserve Bank of India’s annual Banking Statistics. Data in this document are provided on “credit outstanding,” which is the total amount advanced, including all outstanding loans and non-performing assets, on March 31 of the reference year. Data under the head “credit sanctioned” do not represent the volume of advanced in a single year either; in fact, at the all-India level, the figures for “credit outstanding,” “credit sanctioned,” and “credit utilised” are equal. The consequence of this method of collection and presentation of data is that there are no data at all on loan advances by banks each year, that is, on the flow of credit The data on the stock of credit show a marked deceleration in credit provision to the countryside since 1991; had we data on the actual amount disbursed each year, we would have had a clearer picture of the collapse in rural banking in the period of liberalization.

The period after nationalization was characterized by an expansion of bank credit to rural areas: the credit outstanding from rural branches tripled in the 1970s, and continued to rise in the 1980s. After 1988, however, the credit outstanding from rural branches as a proportion of total credit outstanding declined, from around 15 per cent in 1987 and 1988 to 11 per cent in March 1999, and 10.2 per cent in March 2002. Turning to deposit mobilisation, rural deposits grew rapidly after nationalization; their share of aggregate deposits doubled in the 1970s, from 6.5 per cent in 1972 to 12.6 per cent in 1980 and continued to grow, although at a slower pace, in the 1980s. Once again, the peak was reached in 1990-91, when rural deposits accounted for 15.5 per cent of aggregate deposits. The pace of deposit mobilization in rural areas fell in the 1990s.

Given the pattern of growth of aggregate deposits and gross bank credit, it is no surprise that the credit-deposit ratio in rural areas rose after 1969. The ratio peaked at 68.6 per cent in

10 S. L. Shetty (2004) discusses the narrowing of the branch network in rural areas after the onset of financial liberalization. Such an “institutional vacuum,” he argues, is likely to affect outcomes of future policies in rural areas, even the new policy for provision of credit through self-help groups.
1984 and remained above 60 per cent until 1991. In the 1990s, the credit-deposit ratio fell sharply.

One of the objectives of banking policy after nationalization was to expand the flow of credit to agriculture and small industries, or what were termed “priority sectors.” As Appendix Table 2 shows, the share of priority sectors in the total credit outstanding of scheduled commercial banks rose from 14 per cent in 1969 to 21 per cent in 1972 and then went up to 33 per cent in 1980. The RBI set a target of 40 per cent for priority sector lending and by the mid-1980s this target was met. From 1985 to 1990, in fact, the target was over-achieved, that is, more than 40 per cent of total credit outstanding went to priority sectors. From 1991 to 1996, the share of priority sector credit fell, in line with the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee. At first glance, the direction in priority sector lending appears to have been reversed over the last five years. This is, however, a reversal by redefinition: “priority sector” lending now includes advances to newly-created infrastructure funds, to non-banking finance companies for on-lending to very small units, and to the food processing industry. Loans to multinationals like Pepsi, Kellogg’s, Hindustan Lever and ConAgra now count as priority sector advances.11 More recently, loans to cold storage units, irrespective of location, have been included in the priority sector.12

Chandrasekhar and Ray (2004) point to the growing presence of foreign banks in India, their direct presence and their indirect presence through the purchase of shares in existing private banks. This expansion is not good news for the priority sector. When data for scheduled commercial banks are disaggregated by type of bank (public sector banks, regional rural banks, private banks and foreign banks), we find that foreign banks did not lend to rural areas or agriculture.13

Pallavi Chavan (2004) has examined the growth and regional distribution of rural banking over the period 1975-2002. Chavan’s paper documents the gains made by the historically

11 Report of the Finance Minister’s budget speech (Business Standard, March 1, 1999).
12 RBI (2004).
13 See also Narayana (2000), Table 10. Further, foreign banks failed to meet their priority sector targets, even though these targets are lower than for other banks, through the 1980s (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 1992).
underprivileged regions of east, north-east, and central India during the period of social and
development banking. These gains were reversed in the 1990s: cutbacks in rural bank
branches and in rural credit-deposit ratios were steepest in the eastern and north-eastern
states of India. Policies of financial liberalization have unmistakably worsened regional
inequalities in rural banking in India.

As already mentioned, one of our central concerns is the “credit starvation” (the term is S. L.
Shetty’s) of the rural economy, which resulted in shortages of credit for all purposes,
including for productive investment in agricultural and non-agricultural activity. If we
examine the term loans issued by scheduled commercial banks to agriculture between 1980-
81 and 1997-98 (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2002, Table 3), then we observe that, in
real terms, credit outstanding rose from 1983-84 to 1990-91, but fell in the first four years
after 1991 (although there was some recovery from 1995-96 onwards). It is instructive here
to look at the distribution of total agricultural advances to cultivators by size classes of land
holdings. The smallest cultivators i.e., those with land holdings of less than 2.5 acres or
marginal cultivators, were the worst affected by the post-1991 decline in credit to agriculture.
Agricultural credit outstanding to marginal cultivators accounted for 30 per cent of total
agricultural credit outstanding from commercial banks in 1990-91; its share fell to 23.8 per
cent in 1999-2000 (Chavan, 2004, Table 10). At the same time, the share of credit
outstanding to “small cultivators” (with between 2.5 and 5 acres) stagnated while that to
large cultivators rose. Another indicator of the decline in credit to relatively poor rural
households is the fact that the number of ‘small borrowal accounts’ (or accounts with a
credit limit of Rs 25,000) fell in the 1990s (Chandrasekhar and Ray, 2004).

The IRDP was a major component of the credit-led poverty alleviation strategy of the 1980s.
The number of families assisted annually with IRDP loans rose from 2.7 million in 1980-81
to 4 million in 1984 and 4.2 million in 1987 (Ramachandran and Swaminathan 2002).
Although the programme slackened after that, the number of beneficiaries in 1990-91
remained above the level of the early 1980s. After 1991, there was a steep decline in the
number of IRDP beneficiaries: only 1.3 million families were assisted in 1998. If we index
the number of families assisted in 1982 at 100, the number assisted in 1998 was a mere 37.

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14 In 1999, the credit limit was raised to Rs 200,000 (see Chavan, 2001).
The term credit disbursed by banks under IRDP followed a similar trajectory. With 1982 indexed at 100, total term credit mobilized for IRDP peaked at 113 in 1987 and went down to 52 in 1998 (ibid).

**Regional Rural Banks**

Regional Rural Banks, as we have noted, were created in the 1970s exclusively to serve the credit needs of rural India, and specifically those individuals, social groups and regions most excluded by the formal system of credit. For all their weaknesses, these banks passed an important international test. A cross-country study of rural credit institutions threw up the important finding that, in the period 1988-1992, of all the institutions studied, Regional Rural Banks in India incurred the lowest costs of administration, 8.1 per cent of the total portfolio.\(^{15}\)

An important feature of banking reforms has been to alter the equation between different sectors of banking, in this case, to make the norms governing Regional Rural Banks indistinguishable from those governing commercial banks, thus undermining their capacity to serve the special needs of the rural economy and the rural poor.\(^{16}\)

There has been a ban on recruitment to the staff of Regional Rural Banks since 1992 (Jagan Mohan, 2004). At every discussion or seminar on problems of rural credit that we have attended in the recent past, bank officials speak of the impact on rural credit of the greying of bank personnel and the thinning of their ranks. Field officers of Regional Rural Banks in the 1970s and 1980s were relatively young and capable of spending substantial periods of time in the villages served by their branches. Regional Rural Banks have also suffered because they are no longer permitted to recruit agricultural science and engineering graduates for specialised lending (see Shetty, 2004 and Jagan Mohan, 2004). Liberalization has had the effect of crippling Regional Rural Banks, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their original mandate.

\(^{16}\) For a discussion of this important issue, see Jagan Mohan (2004).
It is clear from the preceding sections that neo-liberal banking reform amounts, in theory and practice, to a reversal of the public policy objectives of extending the reach of rural credit, providing cheap and timely credit to rural households (particularly economically vulnerable households), overcoming historical problems of imperfect and fragmented rural credit markets, and displacing the informal sector from its powerful position in rural credit markets. As we have seen, there was a large-scale retreat by the formal sector from the Indian countryside in the post-1991 period. From official policy statements, it appears that the Government envisages only one major policy instrument to fill the gap left by the formal credit sector in the countryside: the establishment of micro-credit projects in rural India.  

The micro credit approach is viewed as being able to rectify the major weaknesses of the banking system itself, most notably the “twin problems of non-viability and poor recovery performance” of existing rural credit institutions (Rangarajan 1996, p. 68). Micro-credit is the favoured alternative to the present system because, first, it is assumed that the transactions costs of banks and other financial institutions can be lowered significantly if these costs are passed on to NGOs or self-help groups, and secondly, because NGOs are expected to perform better than formal-sector credit institutions in respect of the recovery of loans.  

The terms micro-credit and micro-finance have risen spectacularly to fame in the development profession and in development literature in the last decade and a half. The Declaration of the World-Bank-sponsored Micro-Credit Summit held in Washington, D. C. in 1997 defined micro-credit programmes as those “extending small loans to poor people for self-employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care for themselves and their families.” In India, the Task Force on Supportive and Regulatory Framework for Micro-Finance in India defined micro-finance as the “provision of thrift, credit and other financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or

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17 Y. C. Nanda, General Manager of the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) states that, “the SHG-Bank linkage approach is the core strategy that could be used by the banking system in India for increasing its outreach to the poor” (Siebel and Dave, 2002).

18 Transactions costs include the costs of information collection, of screening of borrowers and of projects (by means of project evaluation), of monitoring and supervision, of co-ordination and finally, of the enforcement of contracts and collection of dues.
urban areas enabling them to raise their income levels and improve living standards” (NABARD 2000). The Reserve Bank of India uses the same definition (RBI 1999a).

While micro-credit loans are generally advanced for self-employment projects, they are sometimes advanced for consumption as well. Nevertheless, the advocates of micro-credit do consider it necessary for micro-credit institutions to get borrowers to make the transition from consumption loans to production loans (or loans for income-bearing projects) (Rangarajan 1997, p. 71). The characteristic features of micro-credit operations are small loans to poor households in rural and urban areas for income generation through self-employment. Micro-credit institutions may also provide facilities for savings and other financial services. Micro-credit, as discussed in the international literature, is associated with the following recurring empirical features:

- very small loans,
- no collateral,
- borrowers from among the rural and urban poor,
- loans for income-generation through market-based self-employment,
- the formation of borrower groups, and
- privatization, generally through the mechanism of NGO control over disbursement and the determination of the terms and conditions attached to each loan.

In an earlier paper, we reviewed the two claims in support of NGO-controlled micro credit, that is, lower transactions costs and a better repayment record than that of formal-sector financial institutions (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2002). The international evidence on administrative costs of NGOs shows that these costs were high (and administrative costs are, of course, the major component of total transactions costs) and relatively higher than those of commercial banks.\(^{19}\) NGOs cannot match the economies of scale of a comprehensive system of banking (in the case of India, perhaps the best network of rural banks in the less developed world). Secondly, the costs of administration of NGO-

\(^{19}\) As mentioned earlier, the cross-country study of rural credit institutions by Hulme and Mosley showed that, of all the institutions studies, Regional Rural Banks in India incurred the lowest administrative costs (Hulme and Mosley 1996, cited in Chavan and Ramakumar 2002).
controlled micro-credit have actually risen when NGO activity is scaled up.\textsuperscript{20} Thirdly, repayment rates in NGO-controlled micro-credit projects are related directly to the level of administrative costs and mobilization efforts.\textsuperscript{21}

High-cost NGO operations are financed either by donor funds or by raising interest rates to levels higher than those offered by the banking system or by doing both.\textsuperscript{22} It is acknowledged widely that interest rates charged by micro-credit organizations are higher than the corresponding rates charged by commercial banks or other financial institutions.\textsuperscript{23} Thus we argued that the transfer of the task of serving the credit needs of rural borrowers from the banking system to NGO-controlled micro-credit projects does not reduce transactions costs but, in effect, transfers transactions costs – higher transactions costs - to donors as well as borrowers.

Reviewing interest rates on micro-credit loans, R. Ramakumar and Pallavi Chavan (2004) observe that annual rates ranged from 24 to 36 per cent on bank-linked schemes refinanced by NABARD. Some studies, however, found rates of interest that were even higher, and as much as 60 per cent per annum. To sum up, interest rates for micro-credit loans are undoubtedly higher than those charged by the banking sector for agricultural loans, and the interest rate spread is also larger.

The other salient feature of micro-credit, high repayment, is not a costless achievement. First, a system based on the quick repayment of very small loans does not allow for funds to go into income-bearing activities that have a gestation period of any significance. Only projects with very quick rates of return and high rates of return relative to the tiny investment can meet existing repayment schedules. This pattern of repayment can put the poorest out of the pale of micro-credit, since the ability to pay the first few instalments

\textsuperscript{20} As the Grameen Bank expanded its activities, administrative costs rose from 8.6 per cent of liabilities in 1988 to 18.1 per cent of liabilities in 1992 (Hossain 1988, cited in Chavan and Ramakumar 2002).

\textsuperscript{21} Organizations such as the Grameen Bank need large numbers of employees for regular monitoring and assessment, to conduct weekly visits and meetings and to collect dues (Hossain, 1993). See, also Rahman 1999, and Bhat and Tang 1998, cited in Chavan and Ramakumar 2002. See also Kelkar, Nathan and Jahan (2004) on the high cost of NGO credit in Bangladesh.

\textsuperscript{22} On dependence of the Grameen Bank on donor funds, see Hossain, 2000.

\textsuperscript{23} In fact, some scholars argue that, in the era of financial liberalization, NGOs too are “free to charge whatever interest rates they wish in order to cover the (at present very considerable) costs of institution building, supervision, experimentation and insurance” (Mosley 1999, p 377).
depends on the initial resource base of the borrower. Secondly, high repayment is dependent
on high transactions costs. As already mentioned, NGOs invest heavily in supervising,
monitoring and enforcing loan repayments. When the activities of NGO-controlled micro-
credit projects are scaled up, the relative burden of administrative costs tends to increase. An
evaluation of SEWA bank, a bank set up by the Self Employed Women’s Association
(SEWA) showed that the proportion of overdues to total advances was actually marginally
higher than the corresponding ratio for public-sector banks. Scaling up NGO-controlled
micro-credit, it appears, can generate problems similar to those faced by traditional banking
institutions. The corrective measures being taken by SEWA Bank to address the problem of
overdue loans involve greater supervision and monitoring (Ghosh 2001). In short, higher
and better repayment requires more staff and closer monitoring, or higher transactions costs.

In India, NGO-controlled micro-credit is not yet as widespread and does not represent as
general a policy towards rural credit as it is and does, for instance, in Bangladesh.
Nevertheless, the scale of bank finance through self-help groups has expanded rapidly in the
last few years, and is even considered “the largest and fastest growing example of micro
finance in the world” (RBI, 2004 a). Witness the proliferation of self help groups: from less
than 10,000 in 1996-97, the number of self-help groups (SHGs) with bank finance has
grown to 10 lakhs in 2004. And the total bank lending to self help groups has crossed Rs
3500 crores (RBI, 2004a). NABARD has set a goal of creating 1 million self help groups by
2007-8 in order to reach around 40 million persons.

Andhra Pradesh has been something of a leader in establishing self help groups: by 2002,
over 50 per cent of the self help groups in the country (and 20 per cent of all self help
groups in the world) were in Andhra Pradesh. Despite the growth in numbers – with over 3
lakh self help groups by 2002 – only 0.6 per cent of total bank credit in Andhra Pradesh was
channelled to self help groups in 2002.

The results of a recent case study by Smriti Rao of the costs and benefits of participation in
women’s self-help groups in Andhra Pradesh are noteworthy (Smriti Rao 2004). Drawing on
detailed interviews with women from different self help groups in two villages of the
Telangana region, Rao describes various features of self help groups in practice, among them
the exclusion of the poorest and the perpetuation of existing class and caste hierarchies by groups. She also shows that the State Government allocated very little by way of funds and manpower to monitoring self help groups. Transactions costs were inevitably borne by NGOs or members of groups themselves, including income-poor women. From these village studies, it emerges that micro-credit advances were small, short-term and high-cost. Interest rates on these loans were typically 30 per cent per annum, as compared to 36 per cent on loans from informal lenders. Rao writes that, in her study village, the benefits of participation were “limited to small, expensive and short term consumption loans.” Rao’s study also shows that self help groups in her study villages tend to reinforce the separateness of social groups along traditional lines.

There is as yet no large-scale evaluation of micro-credit institutions and finance as an alternative mechanism for meeting credit and banking needs in rural India. This is an important area for further research. The conclusions of the case study by Smriti Rao, however, are salutary, for they indicate the shortcomings of relying solely on micro-credit to alleviate poverty and empower women.

We have shown that, despite assertions to the contrary, NGO-controlled micro-credit organizations do not incur lower transactions costs than banks (they are able to transfer these costs to others). Banks have many advantages over private micro-credit organizations as providers of small-scale loans. They have advantages of scale; the banking system in India has a reach and spread that NGO-controlled micro-credit cannot begin to match; banks can cross-subsidize loans; banks are better placed to provide specialized training to their employees in development banking; banks are better placed to coordinate banking activity with development administrations, local governments and self-help groups; and banks are better able than private micro-credit organizations to offer a wide range of financial services to borrowers. For the state to withdraw from the field and hand over small-scale credit to NGO-controlled micro-credit organizations is, in effect, to undermine and weaken a major national asset, the widespread rural banking system.
Case studies based on primary data help identify the impact of changes in financial policy and banking structure on patterns of indebtedness among rural households. We shall attempt to review the major results from five papers, each reporting the findings of detailed village surveys on rural credit in the contemporary period.\textsuperscript{24} The studies cover Baghara and Udaipur villages of Giridih district in Jharkhand, Panahar and Muidara villages of Bankura district in West Bengal, Morazha village of Kannur district in Kerala, Gokilapuram of Theni district in Tamil Nadu and Dhamar of Rohtak district and Birdhana of Fatehabad district in Haryana.

Gokilapuram village in south-west Tamil Nadu is a highly-irrigated, agriculturally-advanced and commercialised village. The high development of productive forces is combined with a very unequal distribution of resources: a large proportion of households are landless while a small minority control the major share of land and other assets. The availability of data from two census-type surveys of Gokilapuram, the first in 1977 and the second in 1999, with smaller surveys in the interim, particularly in 1985, allows for a discussion of changes over a relatively long period of time (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2004b).

Resurvey data are also available for the two villages in West Bengal. Vikas Rawal first studied the villages of Panahar and Muidara in 1995-96 and restudied them in 2002 (Rawal, 2004). After land reform in the 1970s and 1980s, there were major changes in these two villages. Irrigated area, agricultural output and yields surged. As in other parts of West Bengal, agrarian structure in Panahar and Muidara is dominated by smallholders.

In neighbouring Jharkhand, Surjit and Ramachandran conducted surveys of rural credit in the villages of Baghra and Udaipur in 2003. These villages are not only less developed in terms of agricultural production than Panahar and Muidara but also poorer in terms of general infrastructure and resources. Udaipur village, a village whose popoulation was almost

entirely Adivasi (or Scheduled Tribe), had fewer landless households and less inequality in
the distribution of land than Baghra, a multi-caste village.

Rawal and Mukherjee (2004) present some features of credit among landless labour
households in two villages of Haryana. In Dhamar village, their survey, which was conducted
in 2002, covered 163 landless manual labour households. In Birdhana, a larger multi-caste
village, their survey covered 282 households (this included households living in the village
settlements and those that lived on the fields) and was conducted in June 2003.

The last case study is from northern Kerala. R. Ramakumar conducted a survey in 2001 of all
landless households whose members participated in agricultural work in Morazha village
(Ramakumar 2004). Morazha belongs to a region that was characterised by widespread and
acute indebtedness among the peasantry during the British period. It is also a region where
there were major struggles against British rule and against landlordism, and where the
cooperative movement took strong roots.

These village studies present some striking observations with respect to rural credit in the
liberalization phase. First, all the village studies report high levels of indebtedness: 64 per
cent of households in Morazha were indebted, the corresponding proportions were 66 per
cent in Gokilapuram, 72 per cent in Baghra, 75 per cent in Dhamar and 83 per cent in
Panahar and Muidara.

Secondly, with one exception, the village data combined with information on the banking
sector indicate that the share of formal sources of credit, that is, commercial banks, regional
rural banks and cooperatives, is extremely low. In Baghra village, for example, only 28 per
cent of total credit was from the formal sector. In Panahar and Muidara, the formal sector
accounted for 24 per cent of credit among all village households in 1995-96 but its share was
nil among landless households. In Gokilapuram, formal sources of credit accounted for 14
per cent of loans taken and 40 per cent of the principal borrowed by all village households.
Class further differentiates access to credit. Among landless hired labour households in
Gokilapuram, the formal sector accounted for only 22 per cent of total principal borrowed.
Surprisingly, in the relatively advanced agricultural state of Haryana, landless labour
households continued to depend on informal sources of credit. Of total credit outstanding among landless households, formal sources accounted for 12 per cent in Dhamar and 8 per cent among manual labour households living in fields in Birdhana. In Udaipur village, somewhat paradoxically, it was observed that the formal sector accounted for 80 per cent of total principal borrowed. Given the limited scale of borrowing, this observation may be explained by the poverty of the village and the absence of informal lenders.

The exception is the village of Morazha, where the cooperative movement is well established and where cooperative banks and societies are almost the sole source of credit for rural households. In 2001, 98 per cent of the principal borrowed by landless households was from cooperatives. Even here, though, cooperatives mainly met the needs of consumption credit and the issue of credit to landless households for productive purposes remained neglected.

A most striking feature of the village data from Jharkhand was that the people at large had no access to the formal sector of credit. In Baghra, only seven households received any formal sector credit at all in the five years prior to the survey. In each of the two study villages, only one household received any formal-sector credit in the year preceding the survey (Ramachandran and Surjit, 2004). The formal sector had virtually washed its hands of any responsibility to the villages.

Thirdly, the two studies that capture changes over time show a clear decline in access to formal sources of credit, particularly credit from scheduled commercial banks, in recent years. In Panahar and Muidara, the share of the formal sector in total debt fell from 24 per cent in 1995-96 to 7 per cent in 2001-02. In Gokilapuram, the share of the formal sector in the total principal borrowed by landless households fell from 80 per cent to 17 per cent between 1985 and 1999. It is worth noting that among landless labour households in Gokilapuram the share of principal borrowed for productive purposes fell from 44 per cent in 1985 to 14 per cent in 1999. Borrowing for consumption purposes dominated the loan portfolio of almost all classes of households.

In the study villages in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, informal lenders are thriving and in fact gained ground after 1991 as a result of the withdrawal of the banking sector from rural
areas. The village studies also indicate the gross inadequacy of credit, especially for crop cultivation and other productive activities. The growing and unmet demand for credit, both for direct production as well as for demands of health, education, and other needs, is resulting in what S. L. Shetty terms “credit starvation” among rural households.

This picture is confirmed by the latest report of the Rural Labour Enquiry, which shows both the weakening of banks in rural areas as well as the consolidation of moneylenders. In 1983, the formal sector, comprising government, cooperatives and banks accounted for 44 per cent of the debt of agricultural labour households. The share of the formal sector fell to 36 per cent in 1993 and further to 31 per cent in 1999-2000 (GOI, 2004). Over the same period, the share of moneylenders in the total debt incurred by agricultural labour households went up from 18.6 per cent in 1983 to 34 per cent in 1999-2000. During the period when the share of formal credit in total debt of rural households fell, the share of debt taken for productive purposes also fell sharply, from 41 per cent in 1983 to 21.5 per cent in 1999-2000 (ibid.).

Despite over three decades of systematic expansion of the banking infrastructure in the country, the village studies indicate that informal sources of credit -- including usurious moneylenders -- remain important, and often dominant and growing, sources of credit for rural households.

In Panahar and Muidara, trader-moneylenders have come to dominate the informal credit market. In 1995-96, 32 per cent of the total principal borrowed by the surveyed households was borrowed from traders. Moneylenders accounted for 17 per cent of the total principal borrowed by households. In 2001-02, of the total principal borrowed by surveyed households, 50 per cent was advanced by agricultural traders and another 31 per cent was advanced by urban businessmen.

In Gokilapuram in 1977, of the total principal borrowed by landless labour households, 27 per cent was advanced by moneylenders and 23 per cent by landowners. By 1999, the share of landowners had fallen to 2.4, per cent while moneylenders accounted for 42 per cent. A major finding of this study is the phenomenal rise in the number of moneylenders, full time
and part-time, village-based and town-based, operating in the area. In Baghra village too, among informal lenders, moneylenders dominated, accounting for 64 per cent of the total principal borrowed by households. The corresponding proportion in Udaipur was 46 per cent.

Landowner-employers were the dominant sources of credit for landless workers in Haryana. In Dhamar village, nearly 49 per cent of the total principal borrowed by landless households came from their agricultural employers.

The rates of interest on loans from the informal sector, particularly from moneylenders, remain very high. In Panahar and Muidara, where traders were the major source of credit, explicit interest rates were not easy to unearth or compute though rates between 36 and 120 per cent per annum were reported. In Baghra, the modal interest rate range was 48-60 per cent per annum. In Gokilapuram, the modal interest rate range was 60-120 per cent for landless households and 36-48 per cent for all households. Among landless labour households in Gokilapuram, the share of principal borrowed at rates higher than 36 per cent per annum doubled between 1977 and 1999. In Dhamar, the modal rate of interest charged by employer-lenders was 36 per cent per annum.

A distinctive feature of the Haryana villages was that the dependence of landless manual worker households on their employers for credit, together with conditions of severe unemployment, forced workers to enter into unfree labour relationships with their creditor-employers. It is particularly noteworthy that unfree labour relationships in these villages coexisted with significant technological advance and commercialisation in agriculture. The study found that, while unfreedom was widespread, there were considerable variations in its specific forms. The nature of unfreedom was closely linked to the high degree of concentration of ownership of land holdings in these villages. Casual workers were subject to various kinds of coercion by employer-creditors, and had also to perform various kinds of labour services. *Siri* workers in Dhamar village worked under conditions that were akin to bondage. They were not allowed to work for employers other than their creditors and restrictions were often imposed even on their physical mobility. In short, the study found
that the dependence of manual workers households on employers for credit was an important factor in sustaining unfree conditions of employment.

INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT FOR RURAL INDIA

In April-May 2004, the Indian electorate delivered a dramatic judgement on economic policy. Thirteen years of neoliberal economic policy (further intensified in the last five to six years) had taken their toll, and there is general agreement among serious political observers that the election results represented widespread protest, rural and urban, against the collapse of livelihoods among the mass of the people. If policy is to repair the damage done to the rural economy, India needs large-scale public investment in the countryside. The links between rural distress and the near-collapse of the formal sector of bank is well recognised, and it is no surprise that one of the promises of the new Government was that it would double the flow of rural credit in three years.

The purpose of this essay is not to evaluate the rural credit policy of the United Progressive Alliance government. Nevertheless, it is clear that if any government is seriously to address the crisis in rural banking, it must reaffirm the commitment of the state to the policy of social and development banking, and reaffirm the part played by the credit system in redistribution and poverty alleviation. Commercial banks, Regional Rural Banks and cooperatives must lead rural credit revival, which is too serious and large-scale a task to be left merely to self help groups or NGO-controlled private-sector micro-credit organisations. The geographical and functional reach of public sector banking must be restored and extended, differential interest policies reinstated, and special loans-cum-subsidy schemes reintroduced on a large scale for all landless and poor and middle peasant households, scheduled caste and tribe households and other vulnerable sections of the rural population. Priority sector norms must be enforced, and, instead of an alternative such as investment in RIDF bonds, penalties must be imposed on any failure of banks to meet these public-interest targets.

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25 For a useful discussion of rural banking policy in the first few months of the UPA government, see Rawal (2004).
If financial liberalization had the effect of damaging the system of formal credit severely, our case studies show that changes in national banking policy have had a rapid, drastic and potentially disastrous effect on the debt portfolios of the income-poor. In general, as formal sector credit withdrew, the informal sector rushed in to occupy the space that it had vacated.\textsuperscript{26} Although it is clear that chronic indebtedness among the rural poor is a problem that cannot be solved by banking policy alone, and that the abolition of usury requires agrarian reform, a decisive change in banking policy is essential for the very survival of the working people in rural India.

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\textsuperscript{26} The most prominent exception in our case studies was one that proves the rule, a village where a cooperative institution that is closely linked with the peasant movement provides consumption loans to the working people.


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Appendix Table 1  
*Number of offices, aggregate deposits and gross credit outstanding, all scheduled commercial banks, India, 1969 to 2002*  
(Amount in Rs lakhs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of bank offices</th>
<th>Credit outstanding</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Credit-deposit ratio (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural (number)</td>
<td>% to total</td>
<td>Rural (in Rs 10 million)</td>
<td>% to total</td>
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*Note:* Data refer to December each year till 1989 and to March thereafter.
Appendix Table 2 *Share of priority sector in gross credit outstanding of all scheduled commercial banks, India, 1969 to 1999* (in per cent)

<table>
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<td>1971</td>
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*Source:* Banking Statistics, different years.