The Endless Eurozone Crisis, Where Do We Stand? A Classical-Kaleckian Overview Sergio Cesaratto

This paper reviews the main causes of the Euro Zone financial crisis and argues that the prevailing crisis resolution philosophy resembles the original deflationary Euro-bias. Endless_Eurozone_Crisis (Download the full text in PDF format) (This article was originally published in The Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistica (Department of Economics and Statistics Working Papers) in February 2013.)

The Target of German Economists Sergio Cesaratto

Beyond any doubt, Hans-Werner Sinn is the most influential German economist. He exhibits a flawless, albeit conventional, curriculum. Revered by his dominantly priggish colleagues, he chairs Cesifo, a powerful group of research institutes in a country in which the economists’ opinion is viewed in high consideration. Sinn’s views are the most pro-German one can imagine and have the sole purpose of depicting it as the real victim of the rest of Europe. It obviously makes little sense to blame Germany or any other country for the European crisis. Each dominant class joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) in its own…

Debtors’ Crisis or Creditors’ Crisis? Who Pays for the European Sovereign and Subprime Mortgage Losses? Jan Kregel

In the context of the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis and the US subprime mortgage crisis, this article looks at the question of how the losses ought to be distributed between borrowers and lenders in cases of debt resolution. The author points out that it is unlikely that debtors can fully bear the losses in a debt resolution. It is argued that the behavior and policy of creditors is just as important a factor to consider in assessing the situation. debtors_crisis (Download the full text in PDF format)

From the Failure of Europe to Possible Growth in the Real Economy Sergio Cesaratto and Lanfranco Turci

The initial enthusiasm of the financial markets over the last European summit was short lived as the new ''kick down the can, grand plan'' to solve the crisis was agreed upon. To bolster the market, the remnants of the famous EFSF 440 billions Euros - which, never forget, was also provided by the periphery countries it was supposed ''to save'' - should be used to leverage new instruments aimed at forming a potential of, say, 1 trillion euros. The idea is to insure 20% of the newly issued sovereign debt of risk countries and to create special purpose vehicles (SPVs)…

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